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Venture capital, credit, and FinTech start-up formation:  
A cross-country study 
 
Abstract 
Growing FinTech entrepreneurship is a recent global phenomenon. Drawing on the national 
innovation systems framework, we examine how countries’ venture capital (VC) and credit 
markets differently affect FinTech entrepreneurship across countries. We argue that with their 
established and globally diffused norms and practices, VC investors—but not banks—require a 
critical mass of FinTech entrepreneurship in a country to more positively influence FinTech 
entrepreneurship. Moreover, we argue that VC and credit markets are substitutes, especially in 
countries with more FinTech entrepreneurship. Using quantile regressions on data from 53 
countries, we find support for our hypotheses.  
 
Entrepreneurial finance markets are important components of countries’ national innovation 
systems (NIS) that aim to spur innovation (Nelson, 1993; Lundvall, 2010) and promote 
entrepreneurship (Ács et al., 2014). NIS refer to the way countries organize their different 
infrastructures, institutions and policies to ensure they interact, promote and then diffuse 
innovations that entrepreneurs subsequently exploit by creating start-ups in existing and new 
industries (Ács et al., 2014, 2017; Freeman, 1995; Lundvall, 1992, 2010). Providing financial 
support to entrepreneurs is among the most widely recognized ingredients of successful NIS 
(Melaas and Zhang, 2016; Nelson, 1993). This support usually takes the form of a greater 
availability of VC and credit (Ács et al., 2014). 
Research shows that the greater availability of financial support increases a country’s 
quantity (level or amount) and quality of entrepreneurship (e.g., Armour and Cumming, 2006; 
Chowdhury et al., 2019; Deloof et al., 2019; Guiso et al., 2004; Haddad and Hornuf, 2019; Popov 
and Roosenboom, 2013; Reynolds et al., 2000; Samila and Sorenson, 2011). Research further 
suggests that VC investors and banks around the world have adopted industry practices (or 
“proven” recipes) to reduce uncertainty, information asymmetry and transaction costs, to foster 
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entrepreneurship (Bruton et al., 2005; Winton and Yerramilli, 2008; Zacharakis et al., 2007). 
However, some other research shows that a greater availability of VC (Florida and Smith, 1990, 
1993) and credit (Cole et al., 2016) are not a prerequisite for entrepreneurship quantity and quality. 
Instead, this research points, amongst other, to a lack of high-quality entrepreneurial initiatives 
rather than a lack of entrepreneurial finance as a bottleneck. Thus, currently, evidence is mixed 
regarding the importance of countries’ financial support systems for entrepreneurship. 
Despite the existence of prior research on the role of financing in promoting 
entrepreneurship, we have a limited understanding of why a greater availability of VC and credit 
is more or less effective in different countries for increasing entrepreneurship, and particularly for 
start-up formations in new “entrepreneurial industries” (Shane, 2008); i.e., those industries where 
entry by start-ups is a recent phenomenon. Our study addresses this important issue, aiming to 
overcome two shortcomings of the literature. 
First, existing multi-country research typically examines how the greater availability of VC 
and credit in a country influences entrepreneurship quantity and quality in the average country 
(Haddad and Hornuf, 2019; Reynolds et al., 2000). Most of this evidence has “been presented as 
though [it is] general and valid across countries” (Ács et al., 2017: 999). We need to better 
understand why the impact of countries’ VC and credit markets on entrepreneurship varies so 
widely across countries. Chowdhury et al. (2019), for instance, find that a country’s financial 
support differently impacts entrepreneurship in the average developed versus the average 
developing country. This finding may reflect variations in countries’ NIS and the dynamic 
interactions among their components (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993). Indeed, the NIS framework 
would suggest that financial and other types of support systems that work in one country might be 
less effective in another country (Li and Zahra, 2012). Yet, evidence on the cross-country 
differences in the effectiveness of these financial support systems for stimulating entrepreneurship, 
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particularly in new entrepreneurial industries, is scarce. However, such industries are characterized 
by significant market uncertainty as well as uncertainty about the viability and credibility of start-
ups themselves. These uncertainties increase information asymmetry, thereby challenging both 
VCs and banks. VCs and banks each address these uncertainties by using their specific industry 
practices (Winton and Yerramilli, 2008). We propose that the established, global practices of 
VCs—but less so those of banks—require a critical mass (threshold) of entrepreneurship in an 
industry to more effectively channel support to entrepreneurship and hence increase 
entrepreneurship levels in that industry. Consequently, we move the literature forward by 
examining how countries’ financial support systems differently relate to start-up formation in a 
new entrepreneurial industry across an entire range of countries with different levels of 
entrepreneurship in that industry. 
Second, prior research has examined the impact of a specific form of financial support 
system (e.g., the availability of VC only) on new start-up formations (Popov and Roosenboom, 
2013). Indeed, this segmentation of the entrepreneurial finance literature has been highlighted as 
one of its key limitations (Cole et al., 2016; Cumming and Johan, 2017). Further, when prior 
researchers have examined multiple entrepreneurial financing markets, they (implicitly) assumed 
these markets operate independently (Chowdhury et al., 2019). Thus, the independent effects of 
specific entrepreneurial financing markets have been explored without theorizing on or modeling 
their possible interaction effects. As a result, we do not know if distinct entrepreneurial finance 
markets complement or substitute each other. This practice contradicts the tenets of NIS which 
suggests that “any systemic approach to measure country-level entrepreneurship has to allow 
system components to interact to produce system performance” (Ács et al., 2014: 477). Thus, we 
also move the literature further by investigating how the interaction between VC and credit markets 
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differently affects entrepreneurship in different countries, especially in new entrepreneurial 
industries.  
Taken together, we draw on the NIS framework to examine how countries’ VC and credit 
markets differently influence FinTech entrepreneurship across countries with different levels of 
FinTech entrepreneurship. We focus on FinTech—defined as “a new financial industry that applies 
technology to improve financial activities” (Schueffel, 2017: 45)—because this setting allows us 
to examine how a country’s financial support influences new firm formations in an industry where 
start-up entry is a recent phenomenon. Arner et al. (2016), for instance, argue that around 2008 a 
shift in the FinTech industry occurred, when entrepreneurial start-up entry boomed globally.1 In 
such a setting, it may be particularly challenging for new firms to mobilize the resources they need 
to form and grow (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002), which highlights the importance of financial 
markets (and other support systems) in the NIS framework. However, past research does not clarify 
the relative importance of VCs and banks across countries in promoting entrepreneurship in new 
entrepreneurial industries. 
 In addition, FinTech is an important, growing industry that has the potential to 
revolutionize financing and how business transactions are conducted. It is a growth industry, with 
important implications for countries’ global competitiveness. Governments across the world are 
deeply concerned with how they can use their respective NIS to promote such growth-oriented 
entrepreneurship that are crucial in our modern knowledge-based economies (e.g., Nambisan, 
2017; Nambisan et al., 2019). Thus, our research context provides an interesting setting where we 
                                                          
1 Arner et al. (2016: 23) highlight that pre-2008 for traditional financial services “[t]he expectation was … that … 
providers would be authorized financial institutions”. Post-2008, Arner et al. (2016: 23) argue that “[t]he critical 
difference … lies in… who is providing financial services, with start-ups and technology firms supplanting banks in 
providing niche services to the public, business and the banks themselves”. 
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can appreciate when countries’ financial support systems are more (or less) effective in promoting 
entrepreneurship in industries where start-up entry is a relatively recent phenomenon. 
Theoretically, the NIS framework suggests that actors in its different parts may develop 
their own and unique logics, reflecting their evolution and learning from experience (Melaas and 
Zhang, 2016; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). These differences may lead to different outcomes that 
need to be harmonized in order to promote entrepreneurship (Melaas and Zhang, 2016; Patel and 
Pavitt, 1994). Consistent with this view, we suggest that several globally established norms and 
practices of VC investors (e.g., Bruton et al., 2005), such as their industry specialization and 
selection criteria, are likely to constrain the flow of VC to FinTech entrepreneurship in countries 
with limited FinTech entrepreneurship. If true, this will result in a weaker positive impact of the 
availability of VC on FinTech entrepreneurship in those countries with limited FinTech 
entrepreneurship. In contrast, banks are known to have developed their own unique norms and 
practices, which focus on firms’ ability to repay debt and the availability of collateral, that are used 
for a broad set of firms in multiple industries (e.g., Mason and Stark, 2004). These practices 
function largely independently of the level of FinTech entrepreneurship in a country. Consequently, 
we expect that the impact of credit availability on FinTech start-up formations, while positive, 
remains broadly constant for countries with different levels of FinTech entrepreneurship. Finally, 
we expect that that VC and credit markets will play a substitutive role especially in countries with 
more FinTech entrepreneurship. One reason for this expectation is that banks could address a 
deficiency of VC in a country by also acting as strategic investors in FinTech, which is more likely 
to occur in countries with more FinTech entrepreneurship.  
To understand these relationships and test our hypotheses, we use a longitudinal database 
that captures new FinTech start-up formations in 53 countries between 2009 and 2017. We employ 
quantile regressions, which are especially suitable to address our hypotheses on how the effects of 
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financial support systems on FinTech entrepreneurship could differ across countries with different 
levels of FinTech entrepreneurship. Standard Least Squares regression focuses on the average 
country and thus “implicitly assumes that the relationships of interest are uniformly distributed 
around the mean value of the response variable (and so makes it possible … to estimate a single 
rate of change that is valid across its distribution)” (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009: 472). Quantile 
regressions do not make such an assumption, allowing us to investigate how VC and credit markets 
influence FinTech entrepreneurship across countries with different levels of FinTech 
entrepreneurship. The results support our hypotheses, showing considerable consistency with the 
NIS framework. We also show that our results are robust to alternative dependent variables, 
controls for new entrepreneurial finance markets, and possible endogeneity issues. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we develop our hypotheses by 
drawing on the NIS framework and the entrepreneurial finance literature. Then, we discuss the 
method including our data sources, sample, variables, and econometric approach. Subsequently, 
we present our main findings and robustness checks. Finally, we provide a discussion and detail 
how our study contributes to entrepreneurship theory and practice. 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Innovation is widely considered as a key source of competitiveness in global markets (Hughes, 
2005). It is a key determinant of entrepreneurship in a society, the source of economic and 
technological progress and job creation. As a result, countries devote considerable energy and 
resources to developing their NIS (Freeman, 1995; Nelson, 1993; Lundvall, 1992, 2010). Nelson 
(1993: 4-5) views “systems” as “... a set of institutional actors that, together, plays the major role 
in influencing [countries’] innovative performance”. Once in place, these systems, infrastructures, 
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and institutions interact to create, diffuse and transfer knowledge that spurs innovation that, in turn, 
can lead to the creation of new firms in existing and new fields. However, these systems, 
infrastructures and institutions evolve at different paces in different countries because of different 
policies, resource endowments and historical factors, making coordination essential to bring about 
desired outcomes (e.g., innovation, start-up formation as well as industry creation). A key tenet of 
the NIS framework is that the interaction among its components (e.g., systems, infrastructures, 
institutions) determines its outcomes; these interactions are usually shaped by the logics (i.e., 
modes of operations, practices, beliefs and norms) that actors in the system developed over time 
based on their experience, policy interventions and learning from others or from experience.  
The NIS has proven to be a versatile and rich theoretical framework that has been used to 
explain how different countries organize themselves to innovate, why they enter particular 
industries but not others (Nelson, 1993), and how they stimulate entrepreneurship (Ács et al., 
2014). The NIS framework emphasizes the presence of different institutions and underscores the 
importance of their interactions, including the presence of “supporting institutions” such as 
universities and research centers that provide skilled human capital and knowledge (Patel 1994) 
and financial markets that ensure the flow of financial resources (Melaas and Zhang, 2016). These 
ideas align well with emerging frameworks on “national systems of entrepreneurship” (Ács, et al., 
2014, 2016) that often prescribe effective national policies that promote the creation and growth of 
start-ups and developing an entrepreneurial ecosystem. They, too, highlights the importance of 
supporting entrepreneurial financial systems that ensure the availability of finance.  
Another attractive feature of the NIS framework is its ability to provide insights into why 
and when certain countries become more active in new entrepreneurial industries. To date, 
however, entrepreneurship research has not provided “adequate treatment [of entrepreneurship] as 
a country-level phenomenon” (Ács et al., 2014: 477). The NIS framework highlights the 
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importance of innovation carried out in the country as a major basis for these choices. It also 
underscores that innovation is not enough to make these decisions; supporting systems should exist 
to create momentum for entrepreneurs to assume the risks associated with new venture creation 
and subsequent growth. For instance, the presence of economic institutions can affect 
entrepreneurs’ capital investment decisions by determining their access to capital (see Holmes et 
al., 2013).  
In this paper, we focus on two country-level supporting entrepreneurial finance systems 
that play a key role in countries’ NIS: VC and credit. This focus is consistent with a stream of 
research that shown how country-level financial support, in the form of VC or credit availability, 
influences the level and quality of entrepreneurship in the average country or across developing 
versus developed countries (e.g., Chowdhury et al., 2019; Haddad and Hornuf, 2019; Stenholm et 
al., 2013). VC and credit availability vary significantly across countries. As highlighted before, the 
NIS framework suggests that the effectiveness of these financial support systems may be 
influenced by the logics, norms or practices of actors in the NIS, which may work better in one 
country than another (Melaas and Zhang, 2016; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008), especially when these 
actors are confronted with new entrepreneurial industries. A number of industry norms and 
practices have emerged that shape the functioning of VCs and banks across the world. For example, 
Bruton et al. (2005) describe how VC investors across the world have adopted many of the practices 
originally developed in the US VC industry. As Zacharakis et al. (2007: 694) state “the VC 
profession exerts considerable pressures upon VCs to employ similar models of venture success, 
regardless of potentially contradicting institutional pressures presented by differences in country-
specific institutions… Thus, as new VCs around the world attempt to reduce uncertainty … they 
choose to copy a ‘proven’ recipe”. Similarly, banks have developed global practices that assess the 
ability of ventures to repay debt and provide collateral. 
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Drawing on the NIS framework, we propose that the relationship between country-level 
financial support systems, in the form of the availability of VC and credit, and FinTech 
entrepreneurship is not necessarily automatic or constant. More specifically, as presented below, 
industry practices adopted by financiers of entrepreneurship across the world, and especially those 
practices adopted by VC investors, may constrain the flow of the available capital in a country 
towards FinTech entrepreneurship, especially in countries with limited levels of such 
entrepreneurship. Consequently, the impact of the availability of VC on FinTech entrepreneurship 
may differ across countries. Moreover, consistent with the idea that components of given NIS are 
not independent (e.g., Nelson, 1993; Patel, 1994; Holmes et al., 2013), we also examine how VC 
and credit markets interact—i.e., whether they work as complements or substitutes—to influence 
entrepreneurship in FinTech, a new entrepreneurial industry.  
Below, we draw on the NIS framework and first focus on how a country’s VC availability 
differently affects FinTech entrepreneurship in countries with different FinTech entrepreneurship 
levels. Then, we focus on credit availability, followed by the interaction between the two variables. 
 
The Impact of VC Availability on FinTech Entrepreneurship across Countries with Different 
FinTech Entrepreneurship Levels 
Consistent with the NIS framework (Ács et al., 2014; Melaas and Zhang, 2016), research indicates 
that the greater availability of VC is expected to positively affect entrepreneurship (Samila and 
Sorenson, 2011), through at least two mechanisms. The first relates to the financing role of VC 
investors. Specifically, they provide “smart” money that is often crucial to form and grow 
innovative ventures. The second relates to entrepreneurial expectations. Specifically, when 
entrepreneurs assess their chances of success in establishing new ventures before founding 
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ventures, (perceived) VC availability is expected to positively affect the decision to enter into 
entrepreneurship by capital-constrained, would-be entrepreneurs.  
Research suggests that the domestic availability of VC, which varies widely across 
countries, is crucial for entrepreneurship (Popov and Roosenboom, 2013). A common industry 
practice adopted by VC investors across the world is to invest primarily within their home country; 
they exhibit “a local bias” (Cumming and Dai, 2010). For instance, despite significant economic 
and policy integration within Europe, even today, some 60% of VC funds are invested within the 
home country of European VC investors (Invest Europe, 2019). Thus, it is challenging to raise VC 
from foreign VC investors and this challenge is even more acute for early-stage ventures (Vanacker 
et al., 2014a). VC investors often adopt this practice of investing within borders because geographic 
proximity is deemed essential to select promising ventures and remain actively involved with them 
post-investment (Gupta and Sapienza, 1992).2  
In addition to investing domestically, as a norm, VCs favor high growth ventures and 
industries. In fact, multi-country evidence from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor shows that 
VC availability “is strongly related to entrepreneurial opportunity, entrepreneurial capacity and 
motivation. It also strongly correlates with high-growth startups, or the proportion of start-ups 
expecting to create at least 15 jobs within the first five years” (Reynolds et al., 2000: 28; see also 
Chowdhury et al., 2019; Haddad and Hornuf, 2019; Popov and Roosenboom, 2013 for additional 
evidence). These observations indicate that an increase in VC availability should positively 
influence entrepreneurship for the average country. As Ács et al. (2014, 2016, 2017) point out, the 
evidence for the average country has often been assumed to be general and valid across countries. 
                                                          
2 Domestic VC investors may form syndicates with foreign VC investors to support entrepreneurship. However, 
international syndicates are typically established after an initial round (or multiple rounds) of financing by domestic 
VC investors alone. Hence, domestic VC investors play a crucial role in the support of early stage firms in a country 
(e.g., Vanacker et al., 2014a). 
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Thus, as countries increase VC availability, this is expected to have a similar positive effect across 
countries. This evidence has often suggested a simple approach to policymakers: when they 
increase VC availability in their country this will also increase entrepreneurship levels in the 
country. 
Drawing on the NIS framework, we argue that the impact of a country’s VC availability on 
FinTech entrepreneurship will be different across countries. Specifically, we propose that a 
country’s VC availability will more positively influence FinTech entrepreneurship in countries 
with higher levels of FinTech entrepreneurship. The NIS framework further suggests that the 
established logics, norms or practices of actors in the NIS may work better in one country than 
another, and as such influence the effectiveness of support systems (Melaas and Zhang, 2016). As 
we detail below, we expect that the common industry practices adopted by VC investors across the 
world might constrain the flow of a country’s available VC to FinTech entrepreneurship when that 
country has lower levels of FinTech entrepreneurship. Hence, the availability of VC will have a 
stronger (weaker) positive effect on FinTech entrepreneurship, when that country has higher 
(lower) levels of FinTech entrepreneurship. We expect this relationship for several reasons. 
 First, contracts between the VC investors and their fund providers (e.g., institutional 
investors) play a crucial role in reducing uncertainty, asymmetric information and related 
transaction problems between both parties (Smith, 2010). However, VC investors are also bounded 
by these contracts, including an agreed-upon investment policy. It is common practice that 
contracts identify the focal area of investments on which VC funds will focus.3 Without a FinTech 
industry of sufficient scale, it is unlikely that FinTech investments will be a major component in 
those pre-determined investment policies or that dedicated FinTech VC funds will be established. 
                                                          




Indeed, for VC investors and their fund providers, it is only economically feasible to set up 
dedicated FinTech VC funds when the FinTech industry is of sufficient scale in a country, which 
guarantees sufficient high-quality deal flow. Consequently, in countries without a FinTech industry 
of sufficient scale, contracts between VC investors and their fund providers are unlikely to include 
FinTech as an investment priority. This situation will constrain the flow of existing VC in a country 
to FinTech entrepreneurship. 
Relatedly, even when contracts are incomplete and leave some discretion to VC investors, 
they themselves often adopt the practice of specializing in specific industries aiming to reduce 
informational asymmetry and transaction costs when investing in entrepreneurial ventures 
(Cumming and Dai, 2011; Norton and Tenenbaum, 1993). VC investors that specialize in early-
stage investments prefer less industry diversity and narrower geographic scope compared to other 
VC investors (Gupta and Sapienza, 1992). Thus, without a FinTech industry of sufficient scale in 
a country, the FinTech industry will unlikely be a focal investment area for VC investors even 
when those investors, for example, have a general investment focus on high tech sectors. FinTech 
business plans are less likely to attract interest during initial selection and are likely to be rejected 
by VC investors because they have a different investment focus (Fried and Hisrich, 1994). 
Consequently, in countries without a FinTech industry of sufficient scale, available VC is more 
likely to flow to other “traditional” industries (e.g., biotech and communication technology) 
targeted by VC investors and for which they have established dedicated teams in the past.  
Second, VC investors across the world have a tendency to employ similar decision criteria 
in their selection and due diligence activities (Knight, 1994) although they might prioritize 
differently across these criteria (Zacharakis et al., 2007). These accepted industry norms and 
practices, which include a focus on human capital factors and market factors, may explain why VC 
investors are likely to avoid investing in FinTech in countries with limited FinTech 
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entrepreneurship. With respect to human capital factors, for example, VC investors typically focus 
on issues such as prior entrepreneurial experience (Kaplan et al., 2009; MacMillan et al., 1985). 
However, most new FinTech entrepreneurs lack prior entrepreneurial experience; rather, their 
background is often in banking (Brandl and Hornuf, 2017). It may take a generation of FinTech 
entrepreneurs and time before entrepreneurs with industry-specific experience emerge. In countries 
with more FinTech entrepreneurship, such experience generation will emerge more quickly, 
potentially strengthening the relationship between the available VC in a country and FinTech 
entrepreneurship.  
With respect to market factors, VC investors typically focus on criteria such as the presence 
of entry barriers and competitor strength. However, before 2008, it was generally thought to be 
extremely difficult for entrepreneurial start-ups to enter an industry fraught with regulatory 
challenges that was dominated by large-scale financial institutions with strong reputations (Arner 
et al., 2016). Such an early perspective is expected to have constrained the flow of available VC to 
FinTech entrepreneurship. However, as more examples emerge of how specific organizational 
forms (e.g., FinTech start-ups) are successful in a country, their legitimacy within that country will 
increase (e.g., Guler et al., 2002). Consequently, in countries with more FinTech entrepreneurship, 
VC investors may evaluate the market prospects of FinTech start-ups more favorably, which is 
expected to increase the flow of available capital to FinTech entrepreneurship in those countries.  
Third, without a FinTech industry of sufficient size in their country, VC investors are likely 
to lack the necessary networks which, in turn, may hamper their selection and value adding 
activities related to these ventures. VC investors across the world rely on their network of pre-
existing ties with entrepreneurs, consultants, other investors to reduce informational asymmetry 
problems (Florida and Kenney, 1988; Shane and Cable, 2002). In countries with limited FinTech 
entrepreneurship, VC investors’ FinTech-relevant networks are expected to be limited. This may 
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hamper VCs’ ability to source relevant knowledge, information, and people. In turn, this situation 
is apt to limit VCs’ ability to select promising FinTech start-ups and to contribute value-adding 
services post-investment (e.g., Shane and Cable, 2002). Therefore, VC investors may be reluctant 
to invest in FinTech start-ups in countries with limited FinTech entrepreneurship. This reluctance 
is likely to limit the flow of VC funds to start-ups in countries with limited FinTech 
entrepreneurship.  
Overall, VC is a crucial form of finance for FinTech entrepreneurs. But in countries with 
limited FinTech entrepreneurship, VC investors are less likely to focus on FinTech investments. 
The traditional selection criteria used by VC investors may also constrain the flow of their funds 
to FinTech entrepreneurship, especially in countries with limited FinTech entrepreneurship. 
Moreover, in these countries, VC investors are less likely to have developed FinTech-relevant 
networks that facilitate their selection activities and value-adding activities. These arguments 
suggest that the generally accepted industry norms and practices adopted by VC investors 
worldwide may limit the flow of available venture capital funds to FinTech entrepreneurship, 
especially in countries with low levels of FinTech entrepreneurship. 
Thus, drawing on the NIS framework, we expect that a similar increase in VC availability 
in two countries may have a different effect on FinTech entrepreneurship in these countries, when 
they have different FinTech entrepreneurship levels. Specifically, VCs are more likely to integrate 
FinTech in their existing practices or routines in countries with more FinTech entrepreneurship, 
thereby becoming more likely to support this new entrepreneurial industry. Such increased resource 
availability in these countries, enhances entrepreneurs’ assessments of the feasibility and 
desirability of creating FinTech start-ups (e.g., Ács et al., 2014), thereby increasing FinTech start-
up formation. These observations suggest the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1: A country’s VC availability will have a more (less) positive effect 
on FinTech entrepreneurship in countries with a higher (lower) level of FinTech 
entrepreneurship. 
 
The Impact of Credit Availability on FinTech Entrepreneurship across Countries with Different 
FinTech Entrepreneurship Levels 
A growing body of research underscores the importance of bank debt (and debt finance more 
broadly) for entrepreneurial ventures, including start-ups. Evidence from the U.S. (Robb and 
Robinson, 2014), U.K. (Cosh et al., 2009), Belgium (Deloof and Vanacker, 2018; Hanssens et al., 
2016), Italy (Deloof et al., 2019) and Australia (Cassar, 2004), among other countries, shows that 
debt is a major source of financing for start-ups, including technology-based start-ups. Consistent 
with the NIS framework (Melaas and Zhang, 2016), a well-developed domestic credit market, 
where credit is more easily available, may be crucial for entrepreneurship as well (see also 
Chowdhury et al., 2019). 
Also, in the case of credit markets, national borders are important. Particularly small and 
young firms are highly dependent on their domestic banking market for access to credit (Zhao and 
Jones-Evans, 2017). To reduce concerns arising from informational asymmetry between banks and 
new firms, banks generally grant credit only to domestic new firms. While foreign banks are 
unlikely to focus on new firms in other countries (e.g., Deloof et al., 2019), entrepreneurs 
themselves also generally resort to local and domestic banks. Consistent with these ideas, 
Chowdhury et al. (2019) using a sample of 70 countries show that the availability of domestic 
credit is positively related to the quality of entrepreneurship. 
We propose that the positive effect of countries’ availability of credit on FinTech 
entrepreneurship will be largely independent of the size of countries’ level of FinTech 
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entrepreneurship. Banks across the world have developed industry practices as to whether to 
provide a loan or not. Specifically, banks’ decision to provide funding to any firm is informed by 
hard information (e.g., financial statements and the availability of collateral). For any firm, banks 
focus on the availability (prospects) of positive cash flows and the availability of collateral and 
give little emphasis to market, entrepreneur and other issues (Mason and Stark, 2004). Hence, for 
FinTech start-ups, banks’ credit provision decisions will not be fundamentally connected to the 
level of FinTech entrepreneurship in a country. In many cases, banks may also require personal 
guarantees or provide personal loans to entrepreneurs, who can then use this money to form and 
grow their ventures. Again, the availability of personal guarantees will not be connected to the 
level of FinTech entrepreneurship in a country.  
Banks across the world also commonly rely on soft information collected through personal 
relationships (Deloof et al., 2019; Howorth and Moro, 2006). Banks have at least two advantages 
when collecting and evaluating soft information related to FinTech start-ups that are broadly 
independent of the level of FinTech entrepreneurship in a country. First, most people that set up 
FinTech start-ups have prior track records within financial institutions (e.g., Brandl and Hornuf, 
2017), which is likely to reduce informational asymmetries. Second, banks are likely to have in-
house specialized experience to evaluate FinTech business plans. Both elements can foster the 
provision of business and/or personal loans to FinTech start-ups, independent of the level of the 
FinTech entrepreneurship in a country. 
Overall, consistent with prior research, we contend that the development of a country’s 
credit market will be positively related with FinTech entrepreneurship given that bank debt is an 
important source of finance for entrepreneurship (Chowdhury et al., 2019). However, we extend 
prior research by arguing that the positive relationship between the development of a country’s 
credit market and FinTech entrepreneurship will be largely independent of the level of FinTech 
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entrepreneurship in a country. We expect this relationship because banks’ evaluation process is 
broadly independent of the size of the country’s FinTech industry. These observations suggest the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: A country’s private sector credit availability will have a broadly 
constant positive effect on FinTech entrepreneurship, independent of the level of 
FinTech entrepreneurship in countries. 
 
The Interaction between VC and Credit Markets and FinTech Entrepreneurship across Countries 
with Different FinTech Entrepreneurship Levels 
The NIS framework also highlights the importance of the interactions among its components for 
promoting innovation and entrepreneurial activities (Lundvall, 2020; Nelson, 1993). As Ács and 
colleagues (2014: 482) state “[a] fundamental defining characteristic of systems is that they consist 
of components that interact to produce system performance”. NIS recognize the possibility that 
different actors (e.g., VCs and banks) operating at different parts of the system may develop unique 
ways of doing things, espouse different policies, or apply different criteria when making decisions. 
These differences could produce conflicts on occasion; they may also induce substitution (Ács et 
al., 2014). 
Researchers have mainly studied the independent impact of countries’ financial 
institutional support, in the form of VC or credit, for entrepreneurship (e.g., Chowdhury et al., 
2019; Haddad and Hornuf, 2019). Further, common wisdom indeed suggests that the different 
practices of VC investors, who provide equity or equity-linked securities, and banks, who provide 
debt financing, cater for different types of entrepreneurial ventures (e.g., De Bettignies and 
Brander, 2007; Ueda, 2004; Winton and Yerramilli, 2008) and thus operate rather independently.  
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However, more recent research evidence indicates that both types of investors at least 
partially overlap in the types of ventures they fund. For instance, in VC-backed firms, debt 
financing also plays a crucial role (Robb and Robinson, 2014; Vanacker et al., 2012). Thus, VC 
investors and banks might at least partially compensate for the limited availability of funding from 
the other source and as such play a substitutive role. Cosh et al. (2009) also find that entrepreneurs 
generally obtain their desired amount of funding but not necessarily in the form or source they 
would like. Again, these observation point to the possibility of a substitutive effect between VC 
and banks as funding sources within a country’s NIS. 
A banking market that guarantees the provision of credit to start-ups could also have a non-
trivial indirect effect on FinTech entrepreneurship. Indeed, banks might not only provide debt, but 
they could also function as strategic investors in FinTech start-ups. Hornuf et al. (2018: 5) highlight 
that banks may “opt for different forms of alliances such as product-related collaborations and 
financial engagements. The latter may come in the form of a majority or minority equity stake”. 
As strategic investors in FinTech start-ups, banks may provide an alternative for traditional VC. 
Actually, banks might be very suitable and effective as strategic investors for specific fast-growing 
forms of FinTech, such as InsurTech and PropTech. 
Insurance is a heavily regulated industry and very complex, even compared to the already 
complex banking industry. Hence, the new players of InsurTech will likely face huge regulatory 
barriers, limited information and limited client base. Banks, however, also often trade insurance 
products, which gives them a lead to support this form of FinTech entrepreneurship or enter 
themselves into this traditional yet increasingly digitized industry. As another example, PropTech 
is related to the real estate market and mortgages, which is still dominated by traditional banking 
institutions. Overall, not only VC investors but also banks can address the financing and broader 
resource needs of FinTech start-ups (i.e., they are substitutes). Thus, we would expect a country’s 
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VC market to exhibit a less positive impact on FinTech entrepreneurship when this country’s credit 
markets are more developed. 
Recognizing that organizational practices diffuse more easily within the NIS when they 
have gained legitimacy (e.g., Guler et al., 2002), the role of banks as strategic investors4 is expected 
to be more pronounced as FinTech entrepreneurship gains greater legitimacy in a country. 
Historically, there has been a “restraint of banks to fully endorse the new possibilities of digitalized 
financial services” (Brandl and Hornuf, 2017: 1). Higher FinTech entrepreneurship levels in a 
country, however, might serve as a key source of legitimacy for FinTech entrepreneurship. 
Furthermore, higher FinTech levels in a country may also create not only a business opportunity 
but also a sense of urgency for banks to take strategic initiatives to not overlook the growing 
FinTech industry.  
When banks were still reluctant to strategically enter the FinTech entrepreneurship domain, 
VC could serve as an alternative funder of start-ups. As FinTech entrepreneurship grew in a 
country, which turned out to become a serious competitor of the banking institutions, banks had to 
defend their positions, for example, by increasing M&A activity with FinTech start-ups.5 Banks 
could defend their position in countries with high levels of FinTech entrepreneurship by acting as 
strategic investors, acquiring their competitors, or entering the FinTech arena with their own 
players. These activities make VC less essential because start-ups can increasingly draw on the 
resources of banks which can serve as their strategic partners. Again, banks are especially likely to 
enter into these strategic activities when the FinTech industry in their country is reaching a critical 
scale and increasingly could function as a credible competitor in their markets. Thus, in countries 
                                                          
4 Note that the role of a bank as a strategic investor is very different from its role of a traditional credit provider. 
5 https://www.cbinsights.com/research/top-us-banks-fintech-acquisitions/  
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with higher levels of FinTech entrepreneurship, banks could increasingly act as a substitute for VC. 
These observations suggest the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: A country’s VC market will less positively impact FinTech 
entrepreneurship when its credit market is also more developed (i.e., VC and 




Data Sources and Sample 
To test our hypotheses, we developed a database covering 53 countries using multiple secondary 
data sources. Our main data source is Dealroom.co (e.g., Autio et al., 2018; Bradley et al., 2019). 
Dealroom.co is an online platform that connects professional investors (as well as corporates and 
governments) and tech companies. Dealroom.co tracks over 800,000 companies and 50,000 
investors. It collects and daily updates its information from sources that include (a) crowdsourced, 
user-generated data from founders, VC investors, accelerators, governments, technology 
journalists, (b) data from social media, curated media, analytics providers and their in-house web 
crawlers, (c) machine learning algorithms that are trained on human inputs and are applied to a 
large data set of “below the radar” companies to predict their activities and growth, and (d) 
Dealroom’s internal research team, which also checks and maintains the data.6 
We selected the FinTech start-ups that were established between 2009 and 2017 (inclusive). 
To do so, we were aided by the fact that Dealroom has a specific search option for FinTech firms. 
FinTech firms are technology start-ups active in financial management solutions, investing, 
payments, mortgages and lending, insurance, banking, and cryptocurrency (in line with the 
definition of Schueffel (2017)). To ensure that all start-ups tracked were included in our dataset, 
                                                          
6 For more details, see: https://intercom.help/dealroom/articles/1897479-how-does-dealroom-co-collect-its-data  
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we removed hidden filters (including the requirement that firms are still active), which could cause 
bias (e.g., survivor bias). We collected data on start-up activity up to 2017 to ensure that Dealroom 
has sufficient time to identify all start-up activity. This step was important because data on 2018 
start-up activity was incomplete at the time of data collection (our data were last updated on the 
13th of March 2019). Given that our level of analysis is the country-year, we aggregated the data 
to obtain the number of new FinTech start-ups at the country-year level.  
We extended our dataset with other variables at the country-year level by adding additional 
data from Dealroom and other multi-country data sources, including the World Economic Forum, 
the Fraser Institute, and the World Bank. We discuss our variables and their data sources in more 
detail below. These steps resulted in a dataset of 415 country-year observations covering FinTech 
start-up activity. 
Variables 
To minimize concerns over reverse causality, we measured the independent variables and controls 
at time t-1 and the dependent variable at time t.7 Appendix A provides an overview of all variables, 
their description, and data source. 
Dependent variable. Our dependent variable is the number of new Fintech start-ups at the 
country-year level (see Haddad and Hornuf, 2019). To avoid double counting, each start-up is 
included only once; i.e. in its founding year. Moreover, to avoid survivorship bias, we include the 
original number of start-ups launched in a specific country-year. Thus, we do not limit our selection 
                                                          
7 In the robustness section, presented later, we discuss additional tests that we have conducted to reduce the possibility 
that endogenous explanations drive our findings. 
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to those start-ups that have survived until the date of our data collection. In the analyses reported 
in this paper, we take the natural logarithm of this variable plus one.8 
Independent variables. The two independent variables that we use in our study measure VC 
availability and private sector credit availability at the country-year level. These measures are time-
varying, available across a broad range of countries and were consistently defined across countries 
and time. 
To test Hypothesis 1, VC availability is measured as an index, which relates to the question: 
“In your country, how easy is it for entrepreneurs with innovative but risky projects to find venture 
capital?” (See also Stenholm et al., 2013). This index comes from the World Economic Forum, 
Global Competitiveness Report—a data source that is often used in multi-country studies (e.g., Ács 
et al., 2014; Haddad and Hornuf, 2019; Terjesen and Hessels, 2009).  The index ranges between 1 
and 7, where 1 stands for “extremely difficult” and 7 refers to “extremely easy”. The countries in 
our sample vary significantly in terms of VC availability with Greece scoring the minimum value 
of 1.7 and the US scoring the maximum value of 5.128.  
The World Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey captures the opinion of 
approximately 12,775 business executives from 133 countries (hence capturing multiple 
respondents per country) and is “the longest-running and most extensive survey of its kind, 
capturing the opinions of business leaders around the world on a broad range of topics for which 
statistics are unreliable, outdated, or nonexistent for many countries”. One could argue that 
perceived VC availability does not capture actual availability. But, the World Economic Forum 
index correlates strongly with other more “objective” measures (e.g., the correlation is about 80% 
                                                          
8 In the robustness section, we also describe the use of an alternative dependent variable measuring the relative number 
of FinTech start-ups. We further present the advantages and disadvantages of absolute versus relative measures. Our 
results remain robust when we use this alternative dependent variable.  
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with the VC investments as percentage of GDP ratio for European countries from Invest Europe) 
that are unfortunately available for fewer countries or shorter time frames. Moreover, while 
perceived availability and objective availability are highly correlated, perceived availability might 
be particularly important because under uncertainty people do not necessarily capture reality but 
form “‘beliefs … of the way the system works” (North, 2005: 2). This is why we have argued 
earlier that the perceived lack of VC in a country might also constrain entrepreneurs from setting 
up a start-up (see also Samila and Sorenson, 2011).  
To test Hypothesis 2, private sector credit availability is measured as an index that ranges 
between 0 and 10, where countries obtain higher ratings as the share of credit extended to the 
private sector increases. This index is a subcomponent of the credit market regulations index from 
the Economic Freedom Index of the Fraser Institute (based on data the Institute obtained from a 
variety of sources, including the World Bank, World Economic Forum and International Monetary 
Fund). Data compiled by the Fraser Institute is also used in previous multi-country studies (e.g., 
Haddad and Hornuf, 2019; Johnson et al., 1998). The countries in our sample show significant 
variation in private sector credit availability, with countries scoring 0 (such as Ghana) and 10 (such 
as Singapore). 
To test Hypothesis 3, we calculate the interaction term by multiplying VC availability by 
private sector credit availability (VC availability x Private sector credit availability). 
Control variables. We also control for a range of other variables that might affect FinTech 
entrepreneurship, the development of VC, or credit markets, and that have been shown to be 
relevant in previous research.  
A country’s regulatory environment can influence its entrepreneurship activity and the 
development of its VC market and credit market (e.g., Chowdhury et al., 2019; Holmes et al., 2016; 
Li and Zahra, 2012; Stenholm et al., 2013). We control for the ownership of banks and interest rate 
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controls, which along with the private sector credit availability (i.e., one of our independent 
variables) are components of the credit market regulations index of the Fraser Institute. We also 
control for labor market regulations, which captures issues such as hiring and firing, minimum 
wage and work hours. Then, we add business market regulations, which capture (for example) 
administrative requirements, bureaucracy costs, ease of starting a business, and tax complacence 
costs. Higher values of these indices indicate more economic freedom. These indices come from 
the Fraser Institute and are based on other data from the World Bank and the World Economic 
Forum among other sources. 
Bankruptcy laws can also influence entrepreneurship and the supply of credit towards 
innovative projects (Armour and Cumming, 2006; Estrin et al., 2017). We include the strength of 
legal rights index from the World Bank, Doing Business database. This variable ranges between 0 
and 12 and captures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of 
borrowers and lenders. We control for the protection of minority shareholders that can influence 
entrepreneurship and VC markets (Vanacker et al., 2014b). We use an index that is available from 
the World Bank and that is based on the following question: “In your country, to what extent are 
the interests of minority shareholders protected by the legal system? [1 = not protected at all; 7 = 
fully protected]”. 
The last regulation-related control variable is the dummy regulatory sandbox. A sandbox 
is a regulatory framework that is friendly to FinTech firms and investments. We created a dummy 
variable that takes value one for the countries that adopted regulatory sandboxes (e.g., Jenik and 
Lauer, 2017) and from the year in which the sandbox became effective. This variable takes the 
value of zero for the observations in those countries when the sandbox was not effective yet, or for 
those countries that have not adopted a Sandbox. 
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We further control for the development of the broader financial system that can boost 
entrepreneurship within a country (King and Levine, 1993). Specifically, we capture the size of the 
banking industry, measured by the ratio of deposits to GDP; the size of the insurance industry, 
measured as the insurance penetration rate (defined as the sum of the life and non-life insurance 
premiums to GDP) and; the development of stock markets by taking the ratio of stock market 
capitalization to GDP.9 We also include the MSCI returns available at Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (Cumming et al., 2010). The MSCI returns of the broad global equity index were 
calculated as the annual percentage changes of the actual values of the index per country. 
Next to a country’s financial market, another important factor market is the labor market. 
We control for the size of a country’s labor force, which is available at the World Development 
Indicators database. It also proxies for the market size in each country.  
We also control for the general economic development of countries by means of the GDP 
per capita (100k), which is available at the World Development Indicators database. 
Some countries just have more technology-based start-up activity in general than in other 
countries. We control for this activity with New Start-up Formation (available in Dealroom) 
excluding FinTech start-up activity. New Start-up Formation (along with labor market discussed 
above) control for the size of the market of each country.  
Finally, entrepreneurship and FinTech entrepreneurship more specifically can benefit 
significantly from technological advancements (Haddad and Hornuf, 2019). We control for mobile 
subscriptions per 100 residents and the Internet penetration rate, available at World 
Telecommunication/ICT Development report database, Netcraft, respectively. 
Econometric Approach 
                                                          
9 These three variables are constructed with data available at the World Bank, Sigma Reports, Swiss Re World 
Federation of Exchanges, Global Stock Markets Factbook and supplemental S&P data, Standard & Poor’s. 
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To test our hypotheses, we rely on quantile regression (see Koenker, 2005, for a comprehensive 
monograph). Quantile regression is more robust, granular, and informative than linear regression. 
Linear regression is based on the mean value, which is sensitive to unusually large 
observations and hence can yield biased estimations, potentially increasing the chances of 
misleading conclusions. An alternative to the mean is the median, also known as the 50% quantile 
of the probability distribution. In addition to the lack of robustness, the mean only tells where the 
center of the probability distribution is likely to be but remains silent on other areas of the 
probability distribution. Quantiles (not only the median but others lower and higher than 50%) 
solve this problem. 
The two drawbacks of the linear regression model, we have just discussed, limits its validity 
for testing our hypotheses. Since the database is worldwide and we want to test differences across 
countries with different levels of FinTech start-up formation, we need a model that allows different 
effects of the independent variables on the number of new Fintech start-ups depending on the level 
of the latter; i.e. the quantile of the FinTech start-up formation. The linear regression model cannot 
do this since the slope coefficients measure the effect of an independent variable on the average 
number (across countries and years) of new FinTech start-ups.10 
Quantile regressions provide estimates that are robust to large observations while allowing 
for different slope coefficients depending on the level of start-up formation. Recall that a quantile 
looks at a particular area of the probability distribution. Visually, we can slice a probability 
                                                          
10 Instead of the linear regression model, one may consider a panel data model with country and year fixed effects. 
This approach brings more flexibility but the effect of the independent variables on the number of new Fintech start-
up is still measured by a single coefficient for all countries and years. The panel data model could be enhanced with 
different slope coefficients per country and for each independent variable, but this renders the model unreliable 
(parameter uncertainty would be too high) and computationally challenging. A simpler alternative would be to run a 
linear regression per country, but independent estimations per country means losing the information in the correlations 
between countries. Also, the number of observations used for estimation would reduce substantially, increasing the 
chances of biased estimates due to unusually large observations. 
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distribution in tranches. For each tranche, we can examine the effect of the independent variables 
on the number of new FinTech start-ups. Important to note, quantile regression does not slice the 
data. All data are used for the estimation of each tranche of the probability distribution, giving more 
weight on data that belong to that tranche (using the so-called check function). 
More specifically, let p denote the probability level of the quantile. The choice of p 
determines the tranche we analyze—for instance, if p=0.50 the tranche is around the median. For 
a given p, we model the quantile of the number of new Fintech start-ups conditional to the 
independent and control variables: 
𝑄𝑝(𝑁𝑒𝑤 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 − 𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑡|𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑡−1) = 𝜔𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1 +  𝛿𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡−1 
Our interest is the 3x1 vector of coefficients 𝛽𝑝.The first element of 𝛽𝑝 captures the effect 
VC availability (needed for testing Hypothesis 1), the second captures the effect of private sector 
credit availability (Hypothesis 2), and the third captures the interaction term (Hypothesis 3). 
We now turn into the display and reading of the results of a quantile regression using a 
hypothetical example. For a sequence of probability values (we use p=0.1,…,0.9), we obtain a 
corresponding sequence of estimated parameters. It is usual practice in quantile regression to plot 
the probability values 0.1,…,0.9 against the estimated parameters 𝛽1, … 𝛽9 for the main independent 
variables (see for instance Coroneo and Veredas, 2012, and Goedhuis and Sleuwaegen, 2010), and 
interpret the plot in terms of the probability distribution. 
For the sake of illustration, let us assume that the probability distribution follows a bell 
curve, represented with dots in the right-hand side plots (Panels B and D) of Figure B.1 in Appendix 
B. We distinguish two cases that are relevant for testing our hypotheses. 
In the first case, all the betas are the same and equal to 0.5, i.e. 𝛽1 = ⋯ = 𝛽9 = 0.5, as plotted 
in Panel A of Figure B.1. (Appendix B). The effect of the independent variable in the number of 
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new Fintech start-ups is positive and equal for all tranches. Since all the betas are positive, the 
effect on the probability distribution is a uniform shift to the right, as shown in Panel B of Figure 
B.1 (from dotted to solid line curves). 
In the second case, the betas are positive and increasing with the probability values. This 
situation is plotted in Panel C of Figure B.1. (Appendix B). The effect of the independent variable 
in the number of new Fintech start-ups is not only positive but also increases with the tranches. 
That is, tranches with a high number of new Fintech start-ups (that are in the right of the 
distribution) are more affected by the independent variable than tranches with a low number of new 
Fintech start-ups (that are in the left of the distribution). In terms of the probability distribution 
(Panel D), the effect is asymmetric, increasing the probability of the number of new Fintech start-
ups in tranches when this number is already high, while the effect is limited in the tranches when 
the number is low. 
 
Results 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the study’s variables. Appendix C shows the correlations 
between all variables.11 We further calculated the descriptive statistics for the variables across all 
the years of interest (2009 to 2017) (Appendix D) and we document the number of countries and 
observations observed per year (Appendix E). As noted earlier, our sample contains significant 
variation in terms of perceived VC availability and private sector credit availability, and our 
dependent variable is highly skewed, which fits together with the use of quantile regression. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
                                                          
11 We also calculated Variance Inflation Factors. The maximum Variance Inflation Factor is well below the critical 
threshold of 10 (Neter et al., 1996).  
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Table 2 presents estimation results for the baseline model (i.e., without the interaction 
effect) and allows for testing Hypotheses 1 and 2. As mentioned earlier, we run quantile regressions 
across 9 tranches (hence 9 columns, one for each probability level: 0.1 to 0.9), representing 
different levels of FinTech entrepreneurship activity. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Results Related to Control Variables  
Before discussing the results related to our hypotheses, we first discuss the control variables. Table 
2 shows that entrepreneurship activity (new start-up formations, excluding FinTech) positively 
affects next year FinTech start-up formation. Likewise, the effect of Internet penetration rate is 
positive and significant for all the different levels of FinTech entrepreneurship activity (except for 
p=0.1). 
Focusing on the macro variables, economic development positively influences 
entrepreneurship (Toma et al., 2014) and this view is supported by our results too: GDP per capita 
has a positive and significant impact across all probability levels. Also, the size of a country’s labor 
market positively affects the number of FinTech start-ups.  
As for financial services, the size of the banking industry positively affects FinTech 
entrepreneurship, which is supported by the literature that suggests that many services of the 
traditional financial services industry are disrupted by digitization (Puschmann, 2017). The 
development of the insurance sector also positively affects FinTech entrepreneurship across all 
probability levels, which is line with the literature that suggests that a strong insurance industry 
promotes entrepreneurship and supports economic activity (Masci, 2012). The stock market 
capitalization to GDP has a negative relationship with next year FinTech start-up formations. One 
possible explanation is that well-developed stock markets push investors to invest less in alternative 
projects such as FinTech start-ups. 
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As expected, the regulatory environment within a country also has a significant impact on 
domestic economic activity. This view is supported by our results since the coefficients of the 
strength of legal rights are positive and significant across all levels of entrepreneurship activity. By 
contrast, protection of minority shareholders has a negative impact. 
Main Results Related to Independent Variables  
Hypothesis 1 stated that the perceived VC availability in a country will more positively impact 
FinTech entrepreneurship in countries with higher levels of FinTech entrepreneurship. Table 2 
shows that perceived VC availability positively and significantly influences next year FinTech 
start-up formations across all probability levels (estimates are different from zero at 1% 
significance level). Moreover, consistent with Hypothesis 1, the impact of perceived VC 
availability on new FinTech start-ups is stronger for the higher probability levels (i.e., countries 
with more FinTech entrepreneurship). 
This effect can be observed graphically in Figure 1, Panel A, which shows the coefficients of 
VC availability at the different quantiles. A Wald test for the null of equality of the nine estimated 
parameters yields a p-value smaller than 0.001, providing evidence that the effect of VC availability 
across levels of FinTech start-up formation differs. Coefficients are not only statistically different, 
but the differences are also economically significant. Specifically, a one-unit increase in the VC 
availability index is related to an almost 25.2% increase in the number of next year FinTech start-
up formations for the countries with the smallest FinTech entrepreneurship level. But, an equivalent 
improvement of the VC availability index is related to an almost 62.6% increase in the number of 
next year FinTech start-up formations for the countries with the largest FinTech entrepreneurship 
level. Combined, we find strong support for Hypothesis 1. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
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Hypothesis 2 stated that the positive influence of countries’ private sector credit availability on 
FinTech entrepreneurship would be largely independent of the level of countries’ FinTech 
entrepreneurship. The results show that private sector credit availability positively and significantly 
influences next year FinTech start-up formations across all probability levels (estimates are 
different from zero at 10% significance level or better). Specifically, a one unit increase of the 
private sector credit score is related to a 6% increase in the number of FinTech start-ups. Moreover, 
consistent with Hypothesis 2, the impact of private sector credit availability on new FinTech start-
ups does not differ markedly over the different probability levels. This effect can be observed 
graphically in Figure 1. Panel B shows the coefficients of private sector credit availability at the 
different quantiles. A Wald test for the null of equality of the nine parameters gives a p-value close 
to 0.99. Combined, we find support for Hypothesis 2.  
Next, Table 3 presents the results of the quantile regression estimation including the interaction 
effect between the two independent variables. Hypothesis 3 suggested that VC and credit markets 
would act as substitutes, especially in countries with more FinTech entrepreneurship. Thus, we 
expect a negative interaction effect between VC availability and private credit availability, 
especially for the higher probability levels (i.e. countries with more FinTech entrepreneurship). 
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, we find a negative and significant interaction effect between VC 
availability and private credit availability, which becomes sharper from the 40% quantile of the 
new FinTech start-up distribution. This interaction effect becomes more negative in the upper tail 
of the distribution. Specifically, a one unit increase of the interaction term relates to 1.3% decrease 
for the countries at 10th probability level. While, countries at the 90th probability level face a 7.6% 
decrease in their number of FinTech start-ups for a similar change of the interaction term. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
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This effect can be observed graphically in Figure 2, which shows the coefficients of the 
interaction effect. A Wald test for the null of equality of the nine parameters yields a p-value 
smaller than 0.001. Combined, we find support for Hypothesis 3. 
 [Insert Figure 2 about here]      
Robustness Checks and Additional Tests 
We conducted a set of additional regressions and tests to investigate the robustness of our primary 
results. First, we used an alternative dependent variable. Second, we controlled for additional 
sources of financing besides VC and credit. Third, we delve deeper into potential endogeneity 
concerns.  
Dependent variable as a relative measure. In our main results, we focus on the absolute 
level of FinTech entrepreneurship and control for the size of an economy.  In our first robustness 
tests, we used an alternative dependent variable: the number of FinTech start-ups squared divided 
by the total number of start-ups launched per country and year. We square the numerator to ensure 
that results are mainly driven by the number of FinTech start-ups instead of by the fluctuations of 
the denominator. Conclusions are qualitatively similar to those in the main results. The impact of 
VC availability is stronger in countries with higher relative FinTech entrepreneurship levels. The 
impact of private sector credit remains broadly constant across countries with different relative 
FinTech entrepreneurship levels. Last, the interaction term between VC and credit availability has 
also an increasingly negative impact in countries with higher relative FinTech entrepreneurship 
levels. Detailed results appear in Appendix F.       
 While relative measures have the advantage of directly controlling for the size of an 
economy, they also have disadvantages. Because the dependent variable is a ratio, a positive, 
negative or insignificant impact refers to the two components of the ratio. For example, private 
sector credit might increase both the entrepreneurship activity for FinTech and the overall market 
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individually. But if the extent of the impact is similar for both components then their relationship 
does not change, and private sector credit appears to have an insignificant impact at the ratio itself. 
Consequently, in our primary analysis, we prefer to employ an absolute measure as a dependent 
variable that directly measures FinTech entrepreneurship but control for the size of an economy. 
However, it is comforting that our conclusions remain robust using a relative measure of FinTech 
entrepreneurship as well. 
 Additional financing sources besides venture capital and credit. We also conducted a 
robustness test including controls for the number of crowdfunding platforms and the number of 
Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), respectively (Data from Dealroom.co). We did not include these 
variables in our main results and interpretation. Our reason for not doing so is that crowdfunding 
and ICOs are part of FinTech, hence there is the potential concern of constructed correlation (the 
independent variables are a component of our dependent variable). However, even when we control 
for these alternative sources of financing, our results still broadly support the hypotheses. Detailed 
results appear in Appendix G. 
 Possible endogeneity. To probe causality, three conditions need to be fulfilled (e.g., Van de 
Ven, 2007): (i) there should be a correlation between the independent variables and dependent 
variable; (ii) there should be temporal precedence, where the independent variables occur before 
the dependent variable; and (iii) there should be no spurious correlation caused by unobserved 
variables that impact both our dependent and independent variables. 
Condition (i) above is met in that we do find significant correlations. Condition (ii) is also 
met. The bidirectional relationship between entrepreneurship and institutions has been suggested 
by Chowdhury et al. (2019) and others. We report our dependent variable at time t and the 
independent variables (and controls) at time t-1. This approach ensures temporal precedence. To 
investigate if condition (iii) is met, we perform additional econometric tests. Because standard tests 
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for linear regression do not generalize to quantile regression, we use a test introduced by Kim and 
Muller (2013). They propose a relatively straightforward way for testing endogeneity in our 
framework. Recall that pi is the i
th probability level (e.g. 10%....90%). Let θi be the percentage of 
negative residuals at the ith probability level. The test is based on testing the null hypothesis pi = 
θi. Put it differently, the test checks if the theoretical and empirical probability levels are statistically 
the same (just like in linear regression, we test that the empirical mean of the residuals is equal to 
the theoretical expectation of the errors (zero)). Since we have 9 probability values, we conduct 9 
tests. Appendix H shows the results of these tests. Since the p-values range from 0.57 to 0.96, we 
can safely conclude that endogeneity does not influence our findings.  
 
Discussion  
Research underscores the importance of financial resources for start-up formation and the evolution 
of industries within countries (Ács et al., 2014). Though there are multiple sources to raise funds, 
venture capital and credit are two widely used sources by start-ups operating in new entrepreneurial 
industries, such as the FinTech industry, which we use as a research context. However, to date, 
research has ignored two fundamental questions that we sought to answer in this study: (1) Does 
the impact of VC and credit availability on FinTech entrepreneurship differ across countries with 
varying levels of FinTech entrepreneurship? And (2) Is there a substitution effect between VCs and 
banks when it comes to financing ventures across countries with varying levels of FinTech 
entrepreneurship? Benefiting from the insights the NIS framework provides, our analyses lead us 
to answer these two questions affirmatively. Our results contribute to several streams of literature, 
including the emerging FinTech literature and the literature on the relationship between 
entrepreneurial finance systems and entrepreneurship activity across countries.  
36 
 
Existing work on FinTech entrepreneurship has primarily focused on the functioning of 
particular FinTech subsectors, such as different forms of crowdfunding (Ahlers et al., 2015; 
Belleflamme et al., 2014) or Initial Coin Offerings (Bellavitis et al., 2020; Fisch, 2019; Huang et 
al., 2019). More recently, studies have focused on the overall FinTech industry. Cumming and 
Schwienbacher (2018), for instance, examine the factors that drive FinTech venture capital levels. 
Hornuf et al. (2019) investigate how FinTech start-ups interact with banks. Our research both 
complements and extends this literature. 
Prior research has also focused on how countries’ financial support systems in the form of 
a greater availability of venture capital (Armour and Cumming, 2006; Chowdhury et al., 2019; 
Haddad and Hornuf, 2019; Popov and Roosenboom, 2013; Reynolds et al., 2000; Samila and 
Sorenson, 2011) and credit (Chowdhury et al., 2019; Deloof et al., 2019; Guiso et al., 2004) 
influence the level and quality entrepreneurship in the average country. Research has also focused 
on how institutional pressures may push investors to operate similarly or differently across 
countries (e.g., Bruton et al., 2005; Collewaert et al., 2019; Zacharakis et al., 2007). 
Reflecting on prior studies, probably the most closely related to our research is the paper 
by Haddad and Hornuf (2019). They use a multi-country dataset (based on Crunchbase) and 
examine how country institutions relate to FinTech start-up formations in the average country. Our 
findings related to the 50% quantile of the probability distribution (the median country) are broadly 
in line with their findings. Our study also relates to Chowdhury et al. (2019), who examine the 
impact of a country’s financial support systems on entrepreneurship quantity and quality, where 
they make a distinction between developed versus developing countries. Our study provides 
evidence on the validity and replicability of prior results, an increasingly important concern in 
many academic fields (Bettis et al., 2016). However, our study is not just a replication of Haddad 
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and Hornuf (2019) or Chowdhury et al. (2019), it also extends our theoretical understanding in 
several important ways. 
First, consistent with the NIS framework, we propose that the global industry practices and 
norms of VC investors (Bruton et al., 2005) will influence the strength of the relationship between 
VC availability and FinTech entrepreneurship across countries with different FinTech 
entrepreneurship levels. The reason for this expectation is that VC investors’ pre- and post-
investment process is more effective when there is a critical mass of FinTech entrepreneurship in 
a country. Consistent with this argument, we find that the relationship between VC availability and 
FinTech entrepreneurship is weaker (stronger) in countries with less (more) FinTech 
entrepreneurship. 
For banks, however, we suggest that their industry practices work differently (Winton and 
Yerramilli, 2008) and largely independent from FinTech entrepreneurship levels in a country. 
Hence, the relationship between credit availability and FinTech entrepreneurship will be (positive 
and) constant across countries. Our findings also support this view. From a theory point of view, 
this evidence clearly adds new important knowledge on how global industry practices of investors 
(and especially VC investors) influence the strength of the relationship between financial 
institutional support at the country level and entrepreneurship across countries. 
These findings reinforce the importance of norms, practices and logics these entities 
espouse, as articulated in other streams of research (Thornton and Occasion, 2008). However, we 
add to this view by highlighting the importance of having a critical mass (threshold) of 
entrepreneurship beyond which this logic unfolds and has profound effect on investment in a new 
but important entrepreneurial industry, namely FinTech. As such we clarify a key boundary 
condition for this logic to have its effect. 
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Relatedly, we also contribute to research on start-up formation in a new entrepreneurial 
industry, FinTech, which only recently experienced significant entry by start-ups (Arner et al., 
2016). This context is theoretically interesting because of the ubiquity of entrepreneurial industries 
and the fact that resource mobilization is usually acute in such a setting (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 
2002). Thus, a country’s financial support system may promote new firm formation. In general, we 
find that VC and banks that positively influence entrepreneurship in general, are also positively 
related to the start-up formation in the FinTech industry. However, we also add important nuance 
to the (often implicit) idea that the “good” systems and institutions that permeate NIS have an 
equally strong effect across countries (e.g., Haddad and Hornuf, 2019). Indeed, our results suggest 
that a country’s availability of VC has a much stronger relationship with FinTech entrepreneurship 
in countries where there are higher levels of FinTech entrepreneurship. These findings add 
important nuance to the findings of Haddad and Hornuf (2019) which speak to the average country.  
Finally, by examining the interaction between VC and credit availability, our study also 
adds to the theoretical idea that countries’ support systems often interact (e.g., Holmes et al., 2003; 
Lundvall, 1992, 2010; Nelson, 1993). This idea has received much less empirical scrutiny than 
warranted, particularly in the domain of countries’ financial support systems. Indeed, as Cumming 
and Johan (2017) suggest, the entrepreneurial finance literature is largely segmented by the source 
and type of financing. Cross-country studies have often focused on the role of the availability of 
VC for entrepreneurship or the role of the availability of credit for entrepreneurship. But few 
studies have examined both in combination, and those studies that do have often viewed them as 
functioning independently (e.g., Chowdhury et al., 2019; Haddad and Hornuf, 2019). However, we 
go beyond these earlier studies by showing that VC and credit markets play a substitutive role, 
particularly in those countries with higher FinTech levels. Thus, VC availability is less important 
for FinTech entrepreneurship when countries have better private credit availability, especially in 
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countries with more FinTech entrepreneurship. Overall, our study provides new insights on how 
countries’ financial support systems differently interact to influence entrepreneurship levels in 
different countries. 
Our results also offer an empirical contribution. They highlight the need for (and the value 
of) having quantile regressions in the entrepreneurship researchers’ toolbox. While we are certainly 
not the first to use quantile regressions in entrepreneurship, they have been only sporadically used 
in the entrepreneurship literature (e.g., Anokhin and Schulze, 2009; Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen, 
2010). This is unfortunate because their use may push entrepreneurship scholars to ask different 
types of questions that take into account the broader distribution of specific phenomena. As 
Andriani and McKelvey (2007: 1225) state: “Scholars need to step beyond the idea that studying 
averages is the only ‘good’ science, is the only method relevant to good management research, and 
is what offers something useful to managers. Sometimes yes, but we think mostly no for 
management researchers”. 
Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
As with any research, our study has a number of limitations that open important avenues for future 
research. First, potential endogeneity is always a concern in a context without a natural experiment, 
such as ours. Although we measure the relationship between country financial support on next year 
FinTech start-up formation across countries, and as such ensure that a probable cause precedes its 
effects, such an approach is not sufficient to make causal claims. Still, our approach is consistent 
with previous work (e.g., Chowdhury et al., 2019; Haddad and Hornuf, 2019) and the NIS 
framework that highlights a bidirectional relationship between systems and outcomes (FinTech 
entrepreneurship). However, we have conducted and described additional robustness tests, which 
suggest that endogeneity does not influence our findings. Future research, however, could identify 
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unique exogenous shocks to examine how a country’s institutional support systems differently 
influence entrepreneurship in different countries.  
 Second, we focus on the relationship between a country’s financial support systems in the 
form of VC and credit on FinTech entrepreneurship. We do not claim that VC or debt finance are 
the only available financing sources that could relate to FinTech entrepreneurship. Indeed, other 
sources of financing might be important as well. In our robustness tests, we discussed some of these 
alternatives such as crowdfunding and ICOs. We also wanted to examine the impact of angel 
financing. Unfortunately, current cross-country data availability on angel financing is very limited. 
While there are important differences in how angel investors and VCs operate, there is also 
important overlap in their practices (Van Osnabrugge, 2000). Angels invest their own money and 
hence they have more freedom relative to VCs to invest in FinTech (while VCs are bounded by 
investment policies agreed with their investors). Angels, however, also frequently rely on decision 
heuristics (i.e., investing in industries they know and where they accumulated experience) and 
networks. Consequently, they might also be constrained to invest in FinTech in countries with 
limited existing FinTech entrepreneurship. These theoretical expectations remain subject to 
empirical test as reliable cross-country angel data becomes available.  
 Third, our use of quantile regressions has pushed us to address new types of research 
questions. Our study has pointed towards the different relationships between some financial 
support systems and FinTech entrepreneurship across countries with different FinTech 
entrepreneurship levels. However, quantile regressions can do even more. Robust measures of 
location, volatility, skewness and kurtosis can be easily constructed with sample quantiles (see, for 
instance, Dominicy and Veredas (2013)). Since they can also be constructed with quantile 
regressions, these measures are also conditional to the independent and control variables. Thus, for 
instance, we can understand the drivers of volatility and extreme variations in FinTech 
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entrepreneurship across countries. Overall, we believe that a better integration of quantile 
regressions into entrepreneurship researchers’ empirical toolbox can help the field by providing 
“new ways of seeing” relationships that move beyond seeing “averages”. 
 Finally, our focus on cross-country differences in FinTech entrepreneurship is consistent 
with the NIS framework but it has both advantages and disadvantages. By focusing on a broad set 
of countries, our study has high external validity. However, we do not consider within-country 
differences. While this trade-off is common, future researchers need to examine if our findings also 
operate within countries. Next, by focusing on FinTech entrepreneurship, we are able to isolate the 
impact of country financial institutional support on entrepreneurship in an industry that was 
previously not populated by entrepreneurial start-ups. We could also focus on other types of high-
quality entrepreneurship, such as ICT or biotechnology but these industries have a much longer 
tradition of start-up activity. Hence, while examining additional industries would allow us to speak 
to a broader set of industries, it could also mask differences in the impact of countries’ financial 
support on entrepreneurship across these different industries with different characteristics and 
development stages. Finally, in 2020, after the time frame of our study, the coronavirus (SARS-
CoV-2) started spreading globally. Future research could examine how such a crisis influences the 
relationships between entrepreneurial finance and (FinTech) entrepreneurship. It is noteworthy, 
however, that start-up entry in FinTech itself started to grow especially after another major crisis, 
namely the 2008 financial crisis. Ultimately, the generalizability of our findings to a within-country 
context, other industries and other time frames remains subject to future research.  
Practical Implications 
Policy-makers around the world are interested in how country support systems and institutions 
relate to entrepreneurship, and especially start-up formation in industries that have the potential to 
shape the future competitiveness of their economies. Our study has shown that a one standard 
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deviation increase in VC availability12 is related to a 26% increase in next year Fintech start-up 
formation for the median country. Moreover, a one standard deviation increase in credit 
availability13 is related to a 12.5% increase in next year Fintech start-up formation for the median 
country. It is also very interesting to note from Figure 1 that the confidence band of the effect of 
credit availability (Panel B) is generally much larger than the confident band around the effect of 
VC availability (Panel A). Combined, the evidence derived from our study suggests that there are 
good reasons why policy-makers should focus on VC availability for entrepreneurship but credit 
availability also plays a role. 
Interestingly, the relationship between credit availability and FinTech entrepreneurship is 
broadly consistent across countries with fundamentally different FinTech entrepreneurship rates. 
The relationship between VC availability and FinTech entrepreneurship, however, becomes much 
stronger in countries with the highest level of FinTech entrepreneurship relative to the median 
country. Our study has shown that a one standard deviation increase in VC availability is related 
to a 18.75% increase in next year Fintech start-up formation for countries in the 10th quantile of 
FinTech entrepreneurship (e.g., Croatia’s venture capital availability at 2.3 would increase to the 
levels of Peru at 3.07). While the same one standard deviation increase in VC availability (e.g., 
India’s venture capital availability at 3.39 would increase to the levels of the US at 4.11) is related 
to a staggering 46.5% increase in next year Fintech start-up formation for countries in the 90th 
quantile of FinTech entrepreneurship. 
Conclusion 
                                                          
12 A one standard deviation increase in VC availability entails a move from the Turkish level at 2.52 to the Czech level 
at 3.30 in the year 2015. 
13 A one standard deviation increase in credit availability entails a move from the South African level at 7.25 to the 
Thai level at 9.37 in the year 2014. 
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In this paper, we studied how countries’ financial support systems in the form of VC and credit 
availability differently influence FinTech entrepreneurship across countries with substantially 
different FinTech entrepreneurship levels. Using the NIS framework, we have argued that with 
their established and globally diffused norms and practices, VC investors—but not banks—require 
a critical mass of FinTech entrepreneurship in a country to more positively influence FinTech 
entrepreneurship in that country. We have also argued that VC and credit markets are substitutes, 
especially in countries with higher FinTech entrepreneurship levels. We examined these issues in 
53 countries over the 2009-2017 period. Using quantile regressions, we find broad support for our 
hypotheses. Our study adds new insights at the nexus of research on NIS, entrepreneurship and 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
  Mean Median SD Skewness Kurtosis Max Min 
Dependent Variable               
ln(FinTech start-ups) 2.14 1.95 1.51 0.67 0.34 7.03 0.00 
Independent Variables               
VC availability 3.18 3.10 0.75 0.24 -0.78 5.13 1.70 
Private sector credit availability 8.12 8.69 2.06 -1.97 4.45 10.00 0.00 
VC availability x Private sector 
credit availability 26.35 26.49 10.05 -0.20 -0.16 48.95 0.00 
Control Variables               
Ownership of banks 8.17 10.00 2.40 -1.19 0.36 10.00 2.00 
Interest rates controls 9.69 10.00 0.83 -3.25 11.28 10.00 5.00 
Labor market regulations 6.59 6.50 1.32 0.12 -0.95 9.46 3.91 
Business market regulations 6.87 6.82 1.15 -0.34 0.19 9.27 3.38 
Strength of legal rights 5.19 5.00 2.64 0.34 -0.13 12.00 0.00 
Protection of minority shareholders 4.57 4.53 0.71 0.01 -0.60 6.22 2.82 
Regulatory sandbox  0.03 0.00 0.18 5.20 25.21 1.00 0.00 
Deposits to GDP 0.74 0.63 0.48 2.86 11.82 3.47 0.14 
Insurance penetration rate (%) 4.15 3.34 3.02 1.51 2.42 17.07 0.57 
Stock market capitalization to GDP 0.84 0.49 1.46 5.79 36.42 11.79 0.07 
MSCI returns 0.00 -0.04 0.34 0.50 0.89 1.23 -0.89 
Labor market (10mn) 4.82 1.49 12.67 4.64 22.13 78.71 0.06 
GDP per capita (100k) 0.24 0.16 0.21 1.00 0.48 0.97 0.01 
New Startup Formation (10) 34.98 5.30 132.07 6.85 49.12 1169.00 0.00 
Mobile subscriptions per capita 1.18 1.16 0.30 0.67 2.32 2.41 0.29 
Internet penetration rate 0.59 0.64 0.24 -0.57 -0.60 0.98 0.04 
 
Rows-wise, the table is divided into three parts: the dependent variable at the top of the table, the independent variables in the middle, 




Table 2: Quantile regression estimation of new FinTech start-up formation (main effects) 
Probability levels 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Independent Variables                   
VC availability 0.252*** 0.308*** 0.288*** 0.335*** 0.348*** 0.369*** 0.546*** 0.606*** 0.626*** 
(0.09) (0.104) (0.092) (0.115) (0.102) (0.089) (0.084) (0.071) (0.058) 
Private sector credit 
availability 
0.083*** 0.045* 0.043* 0.047* 0.059** 0.062** 0.051** 0.052** 0.045*** 
(0.031) (0.024) (0.025) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.021) (0.017) 
Control Variables                   
Ownership of banks -0.107*** -0.065** -0.068** -0.068** -0.083*** -0.063** -0.03 -0.007 -0.023* 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.019) (0.006) (0.01) 
Interest rates controls 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Labor market regulations -0.016* -0.026 -0.03 -0.028 -0.033 -0.023 -0.025 -0.038* -0.019** 
(0.009) (0.021) (0.023) (0.027) (0.024) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.009) 
Business market regulations -0.031* -0.039 -0.052 -0.046 -0.053 -0.045 -0.052 -0.047* -0.036* 
(0.017) (0.027) (0.036) (0.039) (0.033) (0.031) (0.032) (0.027) (0.019) 
Strength of legal rights 0.061** 0.055** 0.054** 0.056** 0.057** 0.07*** 0.053** 0.04** 0.038*** 
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.021) (0.015) (0.015) 
Protection of minority 
shareholders 
-0.374*** -0.383*** -0.303*** -0.305*** -0.258*** -0.303*** -0.341*** -0.348*** -0.235*** 
(0.063) (0.07) (0.074) (0.08) (0.071) (0.068) (0.067) (0.047) (0.04) 
Regulatory sandbox  -0.036 -0.029 -0.035 -0.03 0.008 -0.017 -0.024 -0.032 -0.031 
(0.027) (0.026) (0.03) (0.03) (0.007) (0.02) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) 
Deposits to GDP 0.708*** 0.788*** 0.675*** 0.722*** 0.78*** 0.787*** 0.713*** 0.618*** 0.696*** 
(0.248) (0.236) (0.224) (0.26) (0.23) (0.247) (0.21) (0.171) (0.15) 
Insurance penetration rate 
(%) 
0.094*** 0.198*** 0.198*** 0.18*** 0.162*** 0.165*** 0.135*** 0.103*** 0.099*** 
(0.032) (0.031) (0.028) (0.029) (0.03) (0.03) (0.026) (0.023) (0.02) 
Stock market capitalization 
to GDP 
-0.232*** -0.38*** -0.369*** -0.35*** -0.37*** -0.395*** -0.401*** -0.369*** -0.426*** 
(0.073) (0.069) (0.065) (0.084) (0.071) (0.076) (0.024) (0.052) (0.051) 
MSCI returns 0.128 0.162 0.148 0.143 0.051 0.118 0.134 0.131 0.169 
(0.098) (0.15) (0.132) (0.129) (0.049) (0.11) (0.114) (0.094) (0.106) 
Labor market (10mn) 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.04*** 0.042*** 0.046*** 0.041*** 0.032*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
GDP per capita (100k) 1.28*** 0.78* 0.793** 0.868** 0.913* 1.129*** 1.79*** 1.316*** 1.155*** 
(0.408) (0.425) (0.39) (0.434) (0.475) (0.407) (0.397) (0.347) (0.295) 
New Startup Formation (10) 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
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Mobile subscriptions per 
capita 
0.039* 0.038 0.048 0.039 0.008 0.024 0.046 0.018 0.032 
(0.022) (0.033) (0.047) (0.039) (0.007) (0.02) (0.034) (0.012) (0.023) 
Internet penetration rate 0.304 0.592* 0.871*** 0.976*** 1.085*** 1.18*** 1.182*** 1.56*** 1.285*** 
(0.219) (0.352) (0.369) (0.387) (0.372) (0.351) (0.326) (0.288) (0.238) 
          
Observations 415 415 415 415 415 415 415 415 415 
 
Rows-wise, the table is divided into two parts: independent variables at the top and control variables at the bottom. For each variable, the first row shows the estimated parameters, 
the *, **, and *** stars indicating significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The second row shows the standard errors in parenthesis. The columns show results for probability 
levels 0.1 to 0.9. All variables are defined in Appendix A. All independent and control variables (with the exception of new start-up formation) are measured at t-1, while the 


















Table 3: Quantile regression estimation of new FinTech start-up formation (main effects and interaction term) 
Probability levels 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Independent Variables                   
VC availability 0.280*** 0.611*** 0.552*** 0.708*** 0.867*** 0.952*** 1.022*** 1.115*** 1.369*** 
(0.092) (0.108) (0.108) (0.102) (0.102) (0.084) (0.089) (0.087) (0.044) 
Private sector credit 
availability 
0.122*** 0.127*** 0.134*** 0.173*** 0.197*** 0.217*** 0.241*** 0.175*** 0.221*** 
(0.028) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035) (0.031) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) (0.014) 
VC availability x Private sector 
credit availability 
-0.013** -0.037*** -0.031*** -0.042*** -0.061*** -0.068*** -0.073*** -0.058*** -0.076*** 
(0.006) (0.01) (0.01) (0.011) (0.01) (0.01) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) 
Control Variables                   
Ownership of banks -0.087*** -0.074** -0.064** -0.057** -0.074** -0.057** -0.061** -0.041** -0.051*** 
(0.302) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.032) (0.023) (0.025) (0.018) (0.013) 
Interest rates controls -0.112*** -0.068*** -0.052** -0.068** -0.047 -0.049** -0.038* -0.046*** -0.043*** 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.029) (0.034) (0.031) (0.024) (0.021) (0.022) (0.012) 
Labor market regulations -0.075** -0.048 -0.069* -0.061 -0.053 -0.102*** -0.051* -0.061** -0.051** 
(0.036) (0.032) (0.039) (0.041) (0.037) (0.032) (0.031) (0.028) (0.017) 
Business market regulations -0.009 -0.008 -0.01 -0.008 -0.008 -0.003 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007** 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) 
Strength of legal rights 0.07*** 0.065** 0.051** 0.056** 0.038* 0.07*** 0.036* 0.048*** 0.053*** 
(0.026) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.012) 
Protection of minority 
shareholders 
-0.158** -0.337*** -0.341*** -0.39*** -0.368*** -0.414*** -0.412*** -0.451*** -0.512*** 
(0.067) (0.075) (0.081) (0.078) (0.078) (0.061) (0.061) (0.059) (0.031) 
Regulatory sandbox  0.003 -0.021 -0.014 -0.015 -0.012 -0.009 -0.012 0.002 -0.02* 
(0.003) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.007) (0.01) (0.001) (0.011) 
Deposits to GDP 1.014*** 0.91*** 0.638*** 0.811*** 0.738*** 0.631*** 0.485*** 0.649*** 0.645*** 
(0.253) (0.241) (0.231) (0.255) (0.214) (0.191) (0.172) (0.191) (0.122) 
Insurance penetration rate (%) 0.099*** 0.186*** 0.188*** 0.181*** 0.163*** 0.155*** 0.13*** 0.128*** 0.09*** 
(0.028) (0.031) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.016) 
Stock market capitalization to 
GDP 
-0.332*** -0.361*** -0.322*** -0.352*** -0.344*** -0.317*** -0.258*** -0.363*** -0.346*** 
(0.072) (0.072) (0.069) (0.075) (0.069) (0.063) (0.061) (0.057) (0.042) 
MSCI returns 0.221 0.181 0.174 0.147 0.16 0.07 0.137 0.219 0.197** 
(0.143) (0.162) (0.115) (0.127) (0.131) (0.075) (0.099) (0.139) (0.097) 
Labor market (10mn) 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.034*** 0.049*** 0.043*** 0.039*** 0.028*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
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GDP per capita (100k) 1.136*** 1.116*** 0.708* 0.971** 1.229*** 1.921*** 2.226*** 1.354*** 0.93*** 
(0.438) (0.424) (0.403) (0.476) (0.469) (0.383) (0.398) (0.329) (0.212) 
New Startup Formation (10) 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Mobile subscriptions per capita -0.088 -0.076 -0.062 -0.07 -0.065 -0.059 -0.078 -0.078 -0.071* 
(0.06) (0.055) (0.045) (0.077) (0.068) (0.053) (0.079) (0.051) (0.038) 
Internet penetration rate 0.508* -0.267 1.153*** 0.884** 1.028*** 1.126*** 1.034*** 1.457*** 1.717*** 
(0.283) (0.229) (0.365) (0.402) (0.381) (0.296) (0.316) (0.295) (0.196) 
          
Observations 415 415 415 415 415 415 415 415 415 
 
Rows-wise, the table is divided into two parts: independent variables at the top and control variables at the bottom. For each variable, the first row shows the estimated parameters, 
the *, **, and *** stars indicating significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The second row shows the standard errors in parenthesis. The columns show results for probability 
levels 0.1 to 0.9. All variables are defined in Appendix A. All independent and control variables (with the exception of new start-up formation) are measured at t-1, while the 





Figure 1: Coefficients and confidence bands for the independent variables 
                                   Panel A                                                                                Panel B                                    
Results for VC availability (Panel A) and private sector credit availability (Panel B) from Table 2. For each plot, the horizontal axis 





Figure 2: Coefficients and confidence bands for the interaction term 
 
Results for the interaction between VC availability and private sector credit availability from Table 3. The horizontal axis represents 
the probability levels and the vertical axis the estimated betas (solid line) and the 90% confidence bands 
 
